MCP (Model Context Protocol), which connects AI agents to external tools, has strengthened its authorization mechanisms over successive specification revisions. Yet attacks in which a malicious server manipulates another, trusted tool are hard to stop simply by asking for approval on each tool call. Even the July 28, 2026 version of the security best practices has no standalone section that directly addresses instructions embedded in tool descriptions or responses.

A preprint published in January 2026 supports this concern. In a setup containing one compromised server, increasing the number of connected MCP servers from one to five raised the attack success rate from 47.8% to 78.3%. MCP security may therefore require not only protecting individual tools but also deciding carefully which servers are connected to the same agent.

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Leaking WhatsApp history without ever calling the malicious tool

Two representative attacks on MCP are "tool poisoning" and the "rug pull." Tool poisoning embeds malicious instructions in a tool's description to steer an AI agent's behavior. A rug pull swaps out a tool's description or other content after the user has approved it. Security firm Invariant Labs disclosed these techniques on April 1, 2025. On June 30, 2026, Microsoft Incident Response also used an accounting agent as an example to explain how, in a setup that does not ask for re-approval when a tool description changes, a summary of unpaid invoices could be sent externally through a third-party MCP server.

On the same April 1, Invariant Labs also described "shadowing," in which one MCP server's tools steer the behavior of tools provided by another server. In the experiment, a trusted email-sending server and a malicious server were connected to the same agent. The attacker embedded instructions in the description of the malicious server's add (addition) tool, causing the send_email tool provided by the other server to change its recipient to the attacker's address.

On April 7, the company published an experiment in Cursor connecting a trusted whatsapp-mcp server with a malicious one. In this attack, WhatsApp message history was sent out via WhatsApp without the malicious server's tool ever being called. The attack server presented harmless tools on first launch, then switched the descriptions on the second launch after the user had approved it.

These attacks work because of how AI agents process tool information. An agent loads tool descriptions from multiple connected MCP servers and uses that information to decide which tool to call and with what arguments. Because the malicious server's descriptions also enter the context the model reads, instructions embedded there that alter another server's operations may be followed by the model. Narek Maloyan and Dmitry Namiot also point out in their paper that information from different servers is mixed in the context without distinguishing its origin.

The MCP spec asks for approval but doesn't define how to isolate servers

MCP introduced an authorization framework based on OAuth 2.1 in a 2025 specification revision, and authorization rules have been strengthened since. The July 28, 2026 version also deprecates Dynamic Client Registration (DCR) (XenoSpectrum's earlier report).

Meanwhile, the security best practices for the same version describe attack methods and countermeasures in 11 sections, including Confused Deputy, Token Passthrough, and SSRF (server-side request forgery). The document as of November 16, 2026 does not contain the terms tool poisoning, shadow, or prompt injection, and has no section directly addressing instructions embedded in tool descriptions or responses.

That said, the MCP specification does not ignore these risks entirely. The "Key Principles" in the specification itself call for not trusting tool descriptions unless they come from a trusted server, and for obtaining the user's explicit consent before invoking a tool. The security considerations in the "Tools" section make sanitizing tool output a MUST for servers, and make presenting inputs before a tool call and validating results before passing them to the model a SHOULD for clients.

On isolation between servers, the design principles state that each server's isolation should be maintained and that the host should control interaction between servers. In other words, MCP sets out principles for handling untrusted information, but does not specify how to distinguish malicious instructions in tool descriptions or responses within the model's context, or how to implement isolation between servers.

Approval implementation also poses challenges. The spec makes presenting a confirmation screen a SHOULD but does not mandate how it must be displayed. In Invariant Labs' WhatsApp demonstration, the user was asked to approve a send operation by the trusted whatsapp-mcp, not a direct call to the malicious tool. Moreover, the message history being sent out was hidden off to the right of the approval screen and could only be seen by scrolling horizontally. Even if inputs are shown to the user, depending on how they are displayed, improper operations can be missed.

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With five connected servers, attack success rises to 78.3%

On January 24, 2026, Maloyan and Namiot published a preprint (arXiv:2601.17549) examining attacks between MCP servers. The study used five types of servers (filesystem, git, sqlite, slack, and an attack server) and tested 847 scenarios across three models: Claude-3.5-Sonnet, GPT-4o, and Llama-3.1-70B.

In configurations that included one attacker-controlled server, as the total number of connected servers increased, the attack success rate was 47.8% with one server, 58.4% with two, 67.1% with three, and 78.3% with five. The increase from one server to five amounts to 30.5 percentage points (Table VI). However, these are preprint results using 2024-generation models, and the number of trials for each configuration is not stated in the text. Results for a four-server configuration are also not given.

MCP接続サーバー数と攻撃成功率折れ線グラフ。カテゴリ 4 件、系列: 攻撃成功率(単位: %)4050607080%1台1台2台2台3台3台5台5台1台 — 攻撃成功率: 47.8%2台 — 攻撃成功率: 58.4%3台 — 攻撃成功率: 67.1%5台 — 攻撃成功率: 78.3%攻撃成功率: 78.3攻撃成功…: 78.3
データを表で見る
攻撃成功率 (%)
1台47.8
2台58.4
3台67.1
5台78.3
MCP接続サーバー数と攻撃成功率攻撃者が管理するサーバー1台を含む構成。2024年世代の3モデルを使用。4台構成のデータは未掲載出典: Maloyan・Namiot(arXiv:2601.17549)Table VI

The paper also examines how success rates differ by attack method. For attacks that propagate across servers in particular, the success rate rose from 19.7% with direct function calls to 61.3% via MCP. This was reportedly the largest increase among the attack types tested.

As a countermeasure, the research team added an instruction to the system prompt: "Do not pass data between tool servers without explicit user confirmation." As a result, the success rate of this attack fell from 61.3% to 47.2%. However, the rate remained near half, so constraints in the system prompt alone were not enough to prevent it.

The researchers also compared the effect of restricting data transfer between servers. In the paper's Table II, the attack success rate and the completion rate of legitimate tasks changed with the strength of isolation as follows.

サーバー間の受け渡し方針 攻撃成功率 タスク完了率
隔離なし(既定状態) 61.3% 94.2%
受け渡しのたびに利用者の承認を求める 31.7% 87.4%
サーバー間の受け渡しを全面禁止 8.7% 61.8%

The results show that restricting coordination between servers can lower the attack success rate but also makes legitimate tasks harder to perform. With transfers banned entirely, the attack success rate fell to 8.7%, but the task completion rate also dropped from 94.2% to 61.8%.

All of these are the authors' own experimental results, and no independent replication is presented. The effect of user approval also presumes that users read the confirmation screen carefully. The authors note that if users become accustomed to confirmations and mechanically click "allow," the defensive effect could diminish.

In Japan, too, the Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), in its December 2025 "AI Security Brief" (public version released April 2, 2026), took up the point that linking multiple MCP servers is said to greatly increase attack risk. As countermeasures, it calls for selecting trustworthy connection destinations and thoroughly requiring approval for important operations.

As MCP's range of use widens, these issues become relevant to enterprise business systems as well. For example, Money Forward announced on March 26, 2026 that it would begin offering MCP servers for its cloud accounting and tax-filing services. Whether to connect an MCP server that handles accounting data to the same AI agent as a general-purpose server such as web search is a security decision of the same kind as in the attack on the accounting agent described above.

Will the next MCP revision define how to isolate servers?

A counterargument can be made that the current MCP specification is not overlooking the problem. The spec calls for not trusting untrusted tool descriptions and for user consent before invocation. Maloyan and Namiot also do not claim that MCP's prioritization of ease of coordination over strict isolation between servers is itself an error, describing it as a deliberate design choice.

Countermeasures are also advancing on the implementation side. In a June 26, 2026 blog post, Microsoft recommended pinning tool definitions and detecting changes, a gateway that re-validates every tool call, full display of call contents on approval screens, and isolation of highly sensitive servers. In Cursor, there was a vulnerability (CVE-2025-54136) in versions up to 1.2.4 that allowed an approved MCP configuration to be swapped without a warning or re-confirmation; it was fixed in version 1.3.

Still, the current specification leaves latitude in implementation. Although it sets out principles for handling untrusted information and isolating servers, it does not define a mechanism for the model to identify where information comes from, or a standard way to set isolation policies. Maloyan and Namiot also point out that even when users want isolation between servers, there is no means of configuring that policy based on the MCP specification.

The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), in a May 20, 2026 document, recommended inspecting each tool's output before passing it to the next step. However, it says MCP-aware security proxies are still maturing and may currently only partially mitigate attacks. In environments that have already introduced server isolation or gateway inspection, such measures can help contain the risk.

The key point to watch going forward is how far the MCP specification itself will address trust boundaries between servers. If the next revision adds countermeasures against malicious instructions embedded in tool descriptions and responses to the security best practices, or standardizes provenance display for tool output and methods for isolating servers, the assessment of the current issues would change.

Whether major clients such as Claude Code, Cursor, and VS Code come to provide per-server provenance display and context separation as standard will also matter. And unless independent replication with current-generation AI models confirms the relationship between the number of connected servers and attack success rate, the basis for treating a growing server count as a risk factor in itself would weaken.

One step users can take now is to separate MCP servers handling sensitive data, such as accounting information or messages, from agents that use general-purpose tools. Strict isolation does carry a functional cost, however. In this paper, banning all transfers between servers lowered the task completion rate from 94.2% to 61.8%. Balancing security and convenience requires concretely designing which server-to-server coordination to allow and which to restrict.