Seven Chinese government bodies, including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), on September 28, 2026 released the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) for the new battery industry, setting out development policy for the next five years. The plan aims for all-solid-state batteries to reach a certain scale of practical use by 2030.
However, the published plan gives no specific volume target, such as how many GWh of solid-state batteries should be produced each year. By contrast, it does set numeric goals for existing batteries: a cycle life of 15,000 charge-discharge cycles for long-life lithium batteries, and product defect rates at the PPB level for leading battery makers.
Current solid-state production is also still small next to conventional lithium-ion batteries. If the reported pilot-line capacities of BYD and Gotion High-Tech are annualized simply and half a year of that is compared with China's total lithium-ion battery output in the first half of 2026, it comes to about 0.09%. This is a reference figure calculated from nominal capacity, not actual output or market share.
What the plan shows is that China is pushing ahead with practical solid-state batteries while also prioritizing longer life and higher quality for existing lithium-ion batteries.
To judge how widely solid-state batteries will spread by 2030, it is necessary to look not only at the government's goals but also at current production scale and the mass-production timelines each manufacturer has laid out.
China's 2030 goals: practical solid-state batteries and 15,000-cycle life
The plan is the "15th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the New Battery Industry," jointly issued by seven bodies including MIIT, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the Ministry of Transport. Its document number is "Gong Xin Bu Lian Gui [2026] No. 220."
The 2030 goals include advancing technologies such as advanced electrode materials and new electrolytes, and achieving major progress in research on new battery technologies.
For all-solid-state batteries, the plan uses the phrase "初步实现规模化应用."
Literally, this means "achieving initial large-scale application," which in English is close to "reaching a certain scale of practical use." It can be read as aiming for real-world use at some scale, not just prototype development.
However, the plan does not specify what level of production or number of installed vehicles would count as meeting the goal.
The same 2030 goals also include raising the cycle life of long-life lithium batteries to 15,000 cycles and cutting the product defect rate of leading manufacturers to the PPB level.
PPB stands for parts per billion, so this is a quality target that holds product defects to an extremely low level.
The plan consists of 19 priority measures in five areas, plus five special projects summarizing specific technical challenges. The applications it covers are broad, from electrifying vehicles, ships, and aircraft to energy storage for power grids and data centers.
While the plan aims for "steady growth" in overall industry production, the publicly available targets contain no specific figures for annual solid-state output or installed units.
Note, though, that MIIT's notice carries the remark "本文有删减" ("parts of the text have been omitted"). Because the omitted content cannot be checked, the statement that no volume target exists holds only within the scope of the published material.
Numeric targets center on life and quality, with solid-state a priority development area
The numbers explicitly stated in the plan are the cycle life of long-life lithium batteries and the defect rate of leading manufacturers.
For solid-state batteries, by contrast, the plan does not set a volume target but outlines a policy of strengthening the technologies and manufacturing capacity needed for industrialization.
Priority measure No. 3 calls for building a diverse battery supply system centered on lithium-ion batteries but combined with sodium-ion, flow batteries, and others.
It is worth noting that categories such as lithium-ion and sodium-ion batteries are defined differently from the category of solid-state batteries.
The former are classified mainly by the chemistry used in the battery, while solid-state batteries are classified by having a solid electrolyte. Lithium-ion and solid-state batteries are therefore not necessarily in opposition.
The same measure also sets a policy of strengthening the technologies and manufacturing capacity needed for mass production of all-solid-state, aqueous, and ultra-fast-charging batteries.
In other words, solid-state batteries remain one of the key development targets in this plan. But the public material does not go as far as a volume target that would prioritize expanding their output over other battery types.
The plan also calls for restructuring the industry.
Measure No. 11 supports corporate mergers and reorganization, and Measure No. 12 aims to optimize the layout of the lithium battery industry by consolidating companies and production sites in appropriate regions.
These policies connect to efforts since early 2026 to improve the competitive environment in the battery industry.
On April 9, four bodies (MIIT, the NDRC, the State Administration for Market Regulation, and the National Energy Administration) held a meeting with makers of automotive and energy-storage batteries.
The problem raised there was what China calls "involution-style competition," meaning destructive overcompetition among companies.
The four bodies said they would monitor and adjust to prevent excessive capacity expansion, correct excessive price competition, and strengthen product quality control.
MIIT's published explanation of the plan also lists resolving problems in the supply-demand structure of the lithium battery industry as an important policy issue.
That, however, is the content of the government's commentary; the same wording does not necessarily appear in the plan itself.
The emphasis on improving quality and lifespan of existing lithium batteries also reflects growing demand for energy storage.
According to MIIT, China's lithium-ion battery output in the first half of 2026 exceeded 1,240 GWh. Of this, 420 GWh was for energy storage, about one-third of the total.
For full-year 2024, energy storage accounted for 260 GWh of 1,170 GWh, about 20%.
Because this compares a full-year 2024 figure with a first-half 2026 figure, however, the numbers alone cannot be used to accurately assess changes in output or composition.
The plan also lists development of storage batteries that can withstand long-term cycling as a priority task.
The specific numeric targets reflect a policy of advancing practical solid-state batteries while improving the lifespan and quality of lithium-ion batteries, which already have a large market.
BYD and Gotion High-Tech: how much solid-state capacity exists now?
Major Chinese battery makers are also building pilot lines and mass-production facilities for solid-state batteries.
According to reports, BYD started a sulfide-based all-solid-state battery pilot line in Pingshan District, Shenzhen, in February 2026. Its nominal capacity is said to be 2 GWh.
Gotion High-Tech, for its part, announced in May 2025 that a solid-state battery test line had been completed. Its design capacity is 0.2 GWh, and the company says the yield rate has reached 90%.
Both figures, however, indicate equipment capacity and do not mean that volume has actually been produced.
The 2 GWh figure for BYD is also based on industry reports, and details of capacity and operating status have not been confirmed in official company materials.
Combining the reported capacities of the two companies gives 2.2 GWh.
If this is treated as annual capacity and both companies are assumed to run at full rate, half a year's output would be 1.1 GWh.
Comparing that with China's lithium-ion battery output of 1,240 GWh in the first half of 2026 gives:
1.1 GWh ÷ 1,240 GWh × 100 ≈ 0.089%
That is, about 0.09%.
This comparison has several limitations.
First, the 1.1 GWh numerator is a hypothetical figure calculated from nominal capacity, not actual production.
Second, the 1,240 GWh denominator is China's total lithium-ion battery output, not solid-state output alone.
Third, facilities of manufacturers other than Gotion High-Tech and BYD are not included.
The 0.09% figure therefore cannot be interpreted as the actual share of solid-state batteries in China's production or market.
It is only a reference value showing how large the two companies' reported facilities are relative to China's existing lithium-ion battery industry as a whole.
In addition, facilities still at the planning stage, such as the 20 GWh mass-production line BYD is reported to be planning in Bishan District, Chongqing, are not included in the calculation.
It would also be inappropriate to treat current facility scale as a proxy for 2030 production.
Even so, the figures show that solid-state production facilities are still at the start-up stage, with a large gap in scale from the existing lithium-ion industry.
Taken together with the absence of specific volume targets in the plan, this suggests that while the government aims for practical use by 2030, it has not at this stage gone as far as committing numerically to a large expansion in output.
Solid-to-solid contact: a key obstacle to mass production
One technical challenge making solid-state mass production difficult is keeping the contact between electrodes and the solid electrolyte stable.
In a typical lithium-ion battery, a liquid electrolyte seeps into the gaps in the electrode materials and forms pathways for ions to move.
In an all-solid-state battery, the electrolyte is also solid, so the condition of the interface where two solids meet, electrode and electrolyte, becomes critical.
If contact is insufficient, resistance rises and charge-discharge performance may decline.
Furthermore, when electrodes repeatedly expand and contract during charging and discharging, the contact between the solids also changes. If gaps open between the electrode and electrolyte, ions have a harder time moving.
Depending on the material combination, a mechanism to apply a certain external pressure may therefore be needed to maintain contact.
But raising pressure does not solve everything. Adding components to apply pressure affects the weight and manufacturing cost of the whole battery system.
Achieving performance in a small laboratory cell is a different challenge from securing stable performance in a structure suited to mass production.
The plan also treats these manufacturing issues as priority tasks.
Measure No. 1 lists improving ionic conductivity, improving stability over repeated charge-discharge cycles, and optimizing manufacturing cost.
The section summarizing technical challenges also mentions improving electrode–solid electrolyte contact and designing pressurization systems suited to mass-production processes.
Executives and researchers at Chinese battery makers have also said that practical solid-state batteries still need time.
CATL Chairman Zeng Yuqun rated the technology maturity of solid-state batteries at level 4 on a 9-level scale at the Summer Davos forum in Dalian in June 2026.
In an interview with Caijing in May of the same year, he also said it is unlikely that vehicles equipped with solid-state batteries would reach the million-unit scale in the short term.
Ouyang Minggao, an academician at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, said in a Xinhua report dated March 16, 2026 that test vehicles with solid-state batteries would appear from late 2026 into 2027, while large-scale mass production would likely take another three to five years.
These outlooks broadly overlap in timing with the plan's goal of reaching a certain scale of practical use by 2030.
However, expert assessments of technology maturity differ from government policy goals, and achieving practical use by 2030 is not guaranteed.
No volume target for 2030, but some companies aim for 2027 mass production
China's policy of supporting solid-state battery development did not first appear in this plan.
The "New Energy Vehicle Industry Development Plan (2021–2035)," published by the General Office of the State Council in November 2020, called for accelerating R&D and industrialization of automotive batteries using solid electrolytes.
Guidance issued in January 2023 by six bodies including MIIT likewise called for accelerating R&D on new technologies such as solid-state and sodium-ion batteries, and for studying the development of related standards systems.
These documents called for faster development but set no specific deadline for practical use of solid-state batteries.
This plan explicitly sets a target date: achieving a certain scale of practical use by 2030.
The setting of a deadline shows that goals have become more concrete, shifting from support for R&D to policy with actual use in view.
The plan also sets priority tasks not only for solid-state technology development but also for the manufacturing technologies needed for mass production.
The lack of a specific volume target therefore cannot be taken as evidence that the Chinese government does not value the technology.
Meanwhile, battery makers have laid out plans for limited mass production and demonstration earlier than the government's 2030 date.
Changan Automobile has said it will move toward phased mass production from 2027, and CATL has indicated it expects to begin small-scale production in 2027.
BYD CTO Sun Huajun said in February 2025 that demonstration installations in a limited number of vehicles would begin around 2027, while full-scale, large-volume installation would come after 2030.
It is worth noting that in these plans, "prototype," "demonstration installation," "small-scale production," and "full mass production" refer to different stages.
Even if small quantities can be manufactured and installed in vehicles, that does not necessarily mean they can be fitted to large numbers of vehicles sold to the general public.
For the plan's 2030 goal as well, it will be necessary to check future implementation documents and evaluation criteria to see what stage must be reached for the goal to count as achieved.
Japan also targets full-scale practical use around 2030
The Japanese government also regards the period around 2030 as key for practical solid-state batteries.
On June 2, 2026, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry revised its earlier "Battery Industry Strategy" into the "Battery and Power Source Industry Strategy."
The revised strategy calls for full-scale practical use of solid-state batteries around 2030 and for building a manufacturing base matched to demand toward the mid-2030s.
Development by Japanese companies is also moving ahead.
In October 2023, Toyota Motor and Idemitsu Kosan announced joint development of mass-production technology for sulfide solid electrolytes, aiming for practical solid-state batteries in 2027–2028.
China's goal of "a certain scale of practical use by 2030" and Japan's "full-scale practical use around 2030" are close in timing.
However, there is no common numeric standard for judging whether China's "certain scale" or Japan's "full-scale practical use" has been achieved.
Differences in wording alone therefore cannot show which country will reach mass production sooner.
Both countries treat the period around 2030 as key for practical solid-state batteries, but how much mass-production capacity each company can actually build will need to be checked as progress continues.
How far can capacity expand by the end of 2027?
What matters in judging future progress is the capacity companies announce and the scale of facilities actually operating.
The currently reported capacities of BYD and Gotion High-Tech add up to 2.2 GWh.
If leading Chinese manufacturers were to have around 12 GWh of annual solid-state capacity in operation by the end of 2027, that would far exceed the scale of the two companies' facilities confirmed today.
The 12 GWh figure equals roughly 1% of China's total lithium-ion battery output of 1,170 GWh in 2024, as published by MIIT.
This, however, is not a government target but a reference value set to check the expansion of facility scale.
Even if capacity reached 12 GWh, that would not necessarily mean the same amount could actually be produced and shipped. Judging whether stable mass production is possible requires checking equipment utilization, yield rates, and shipment records to customers.
For BYD, plans to build a 20 GWh solid-state battery mass-production line in Bishan District, Chongqing, have been reported.
If that plan were realized by the end of 2027 and began operating at its planned capacity, it would far exceed the scale of the pilot lines now reported.
But the existence of a construction plan is different from operating on schedule and shipping mass-produced products. Beyond construction progress, official announcements on production start and customer supply will need to be checked.
On the policy side, implementation plans and evaluation criteria that MIIT publishes in the future will also be important.
If a specific volume, such as tens of GWh per year, were set for the current goal of "a certain scale of practical use," the government's direction toward 2030 could be assessed more clearly.
Even if no volume target is set, it remains possible to check how far solid-state industrialization has progressed from companies' announced capacity and actual shipments.
Academician Ouyang Minggao's March 2026 outlook of "three to five years to large-scale mass production" corresponds to 2029–2031, which also overlaps with the plan's 2030 goal.
To judge whether China's solid-state battery industry develops in line with this outlook, it will be necessary to look not only at government targets but also at how far each manufacturer's pilot lines move into actual mass-production facilities and how much they can raise output and yield rates.