On November 5, 2026, the UK House of Commons Business, Innovation, Science and Trade Committee published a report (HC 132) on critical minerals supply chains, warning that Britain is "dangerously dependent" on China. However, checking the report's figures against the government's source documents shows a problem that comes before any policy to reduce dependence: the indicators used to measure its effect are flawed. For example, the report's figure that "lithium demand in 2030 will be 45 times that of 2024" actually compares cumulative demand over six years with demand in a single year. Converted to an annual average, the increase is about 7.5 times (the editorial team's calculation). In addition, the government's target of "no more than 60% dependence on any single country" is described with a different scope in the strategy text and in the government announcement. China's dominance of supply is still a serious problem, but assessing progress on countermeasures requires a clear baseline for measuring demand and dependence.
The Committee's Warning on China Dependence and Its 10-Test Framework
In its November 5 announcement, the committee said China's control of critical minerals supply chains poses a serious risk to Britain's economic security. The report cites government estimates that lithium demand will rise 45-fold and rare earths 16-fold by 2030, and urges the government to diversify supply sources quickly. A government spokesperson responded that £400 million is being invested in expanding domestic production and recycling, and set targets for 2035: meeting 10% of demand through domestic production and 20% through recycling, while keeping procurement from any single country at or below 60%.
Committee chair Liam Byrne criticized the UK for remaining dangerously exposed 16 years after China first used its control of rare earth supply as diplomatic leverage. According to the report, China informally halted rare earth exports to Japan in 2010, and prices subsequently rose 26-fold. The committee is concerned that Britain is not adequately prepared for a similar supply disruption.
To assess the government's critical minerals policy, the committee set 10 tests. It says it cannot currently be confident the government passes even one of them. Particularly relevant to the figures at issue here are Test 2, which asks whether the government understands the volume and value of the critical minerals it needs, and Test 4, which asks whether it has identified supply chain bottlenecks and vulnerabilities. Both presuppose an accurate grasp of what Britain needs, in what quantities, and how much it depends on which countries.
One of the report's main recommendations is the creation of a "Critical Minerals Finance Facility." The idea is to coordinate funding and support functions from UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), British International Investment, UK Export Finance, and the National Wealth Fund, backing critical minerals projects at home and abroad through a single channel. The committee calls for the use of subsidies, equity, loans, and guarantees, as well as long-term purchase agreements and minimum price guarantees (Recommendations 30 and 31). Separately, the government's critical minerals strategy, "Vision 2035," sets out up to £50 million (about ¥10.7 billion, converted at £1 = ¥213.27 on November 5, 2026) for domestic critical minerals projects, but this has not been confirmed as the budget for the new finance facility the committee proposed.
"45x Lithium Demand" Compared Six Years of Cumulative Demand with a Single Year
Table 1 of the report states that UK lithium demand will rise from 2,525 tonnes in 2024 to 113,400 tonnes in 2030, roughly 45 times. The 2030 column is labeled "UK demand in 2030," which reads as saying that the amount needed in the single year 2030 will be 45 times that of 2024. For rare earths, the report likewise describes a rise from 1,161 tonnes in 2024 to 18,020 tonnes in 2030, about 16 times.
However, checking the source, the UK government's technical annex to the critical minerals strategy, the table containing the same figures is headed "cumulative demand estimates." In other words, the 2030 figures do not represent demand in the single year 2030 but cumulative demand over the six years from 2025 to 2030. The difference can be confirmed from the antimony figures, where demand is assumed to be constant each year.
| Table year | Antimony demand (tonnes) | Ratio to 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 428 | 1x |
| 2027 | 1,284 | 3x |
| 2030 | 2,568 | 6x |
| 2035 | 4,707 | about 11x |
The technical annex explains that for minerals lacking data on demand growth rates, it calculated cumulative figures assuming constant annual demand. For antimony, on the premise of 428 tonnes a year, the 1,284 tonnes for 2027 equals three years, the 2,568 tonnes for 2030 equals six years, and the 4,707 tonnes for 2035 equals about 11 years. The increase tracks the number of years elapsed since 2025, showing that each column represents cumulative demand rather than a single year. The Vision 2035 strategy text also presents the same table as cumulative demand estimates and states that defense industry demand is excluded from the estimates.
Under this definition, the lithium figure of 113,400 tonnes is cumulative demand over the six years 2025–2030. Dividing by six gives average annual demand of 18,900 tonnes, about 7.5 times the 2,525 tonnes of 2024. This is the editorial team's calculation using the lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) figures in the government's technical annex. The report's "45x" compares six-year cumulative demand with single-year 2024 demand, while "about 7.5x" compares the six-year annual average with 2024. Because the comparison bases differ, 45x cannot properly be treated as the rate of increase in single-year demand for 2030.
The 7.5x figure, however, does not represent single-year 2030 demand either. According to the technical annex, cumulative lithium demand is 28,680 tonnes over the three years 2025–2027 and 84,720 tonnes over the three years 2028–2030, so demand is expected to grow substantially in the later period. The average for the latter three years is 28,240 tonnes a year, about 11.2 times 2024. Single-year demand in 2030 could therefore exceed the six-year average, but the documents reviewed do not list demand for each year, so the increase for 2030 alone cannot be calculated.
The report presents the 45x figure as a government estimate, but the government documents reviewed contain no such multiple; they give the 2,525 tonnes for 2024 and the 113,400-tonne cumulative total through 2030 on which the calculation is based. Who calculated the multiple cannot be determined. Calculating the same way for rare earths, average demand over six years is about 3,003 tonnes a year, about 2.6 times 2024, and the average over the three years 2028–2030 is also about 2.9 times (editorial calculation). The broad direction, that demand for critical minerals will surge, is unchanged, but comparing figures across different periods misstates the scale of the increase.
Inconsistent Definitions of the "60% From Any Single Country" Target
Beyond the demand estimates, the government's target for supply dependence is also described inconsistently. Vision 2035 sets three targets for 2035: meeting at least 10% of annual critical minerals demand through domestic production and 20% through recycling, and limiting the share supplied by any single country to 60% or less. The question is whether the 60% refers to the aggregate across all critical minerals or applies to each mineral individually.
The Vision 2035 strategy text specifies that the share supplied by any one country should be 60% or less of annual critical minerals demand "in the aggregate." By contrast, the government announcement of November 22, 2025 describes it as limiting imports from any one country to 60% or less for any critical mineral. A parliamentary written answer of June 11, 2026 likewise set out a policy of limiting procurement from a single country to 60% or less for individual critical minerals. The government consistently aims to diversify supply sources, but the strategy text and external explanations do not agree on the target's scope.
This difference directly affects how achievement of the target is judged. If 60% or less is required for each mineral, then for lithium and rare earths alike, dependence on a particular country must be kept below the threshold. Under an approach that aggregates all critical minerals, high dependence on an individual mineral could be buried in the overall figure. Moreover, the strategy text's description of the 60% target alone does not make clear whether different minerals are aggregated by weight or by value. The government says it will use HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) import statistics by country of origin to measure the target, but the aggregation method needs explaining.
That said, it is not the case that no mineral-level dependence data have been published. The June 11, 2026 parliamentary answer used HMRC import statistics to publish, for each mineral for 2023–2025, the country that was the largest source of imports and its share of import weight. In 2025, China accounted for 47% of rare earths, 69% of graphite, and 63% of tantalum. The largest source of lithium imports, by contrast, was Chile at 68%. These figures are based on imports by country of origin by weight, and do not directly show how much Britain depends on Chinese refining capacity or on supply chains passing through China. Also, because the table shows only the largest source, the share of imports from China cannot be read for minerals where China is not the largest source.
Japan's experience also shows that overall dependence and dependence on individual minerals can differ. Nomura Research Institute's Takahide Kiuchi, in a November 2025 analysis, said Japan's dependence on China for imported rare earths has fallen from about 90% around the time of the Senkaku dispute to around 60%. For heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium, used in electric vehicle motors and other products, however, Japan still reportedly depends on China for almost 100%. To assess whether dependence may be concentrated in specific minerals in Britain, too, analysis of supply chains including the mining and refining stages is needed, not just import shares by mineral.
Will the Government's Response Clarify How Demand and Supply Risk Are Measured?
Problems with the demand multiples and target definitions do not, however, change the fundamental risk of supply concentrated in China. According to International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates cited in the report, China is the world's largest refiner for 19 of 20 strategic minerals, with an average share of 70%. The report also cites the UK Critical Minerals Intelligence Centre (UK CMIC) assessment that China accounts for 95% of global gallium production, 93% of germanium, and 79% of tungsten supply. Revising the demand estimation method would not remove this concentration. Behind the committee's call to diversify supply sources quickly lies a serious imbalance in actual supply chains.
The government's decision not to publish detailed information on security grounds also makes it harder for Parliament to assess policy. According to the report, the government declined to disclose the list of capabilities it should maintain domestically, citing the risk that information would become outdated as technology advances and that hostile actors could learn of vulnerabilities. The committee, pointing to Japan's publication of a list of critical goods, calls for greater transparency.
There is a reasonable counterargument: the essential problem is the concentration of refining capacity in China, and the supply risk is the same whether the demand growth is 45x or 7.5x. But that does not mean it is acceptable to leave the indicators for measuring policy results unclear. Without an accurate picture of required volumes and dependence, it is harder to judge which minerals to prioritize for diversifying sources, and how much money to put into which measures. Tests 2 and 4 of the committee ask precisely about this information, which underpins policy decisions.
In Recommendation 9, the committee asks the government to make clear which minerals it will pursue through domestic sourcing and which it will address by reducing supply risk through cooperation with allies. It also proposes that the government set out, mineral by mineral, the expected share of Britain's overall demand to be met by domestic production and by supply from allies, and report progress to Parliament each year. If implemented, this would make it easier to continuously verify how far diversification of supply sources has progressed. However, Recommendation 9 does not directly call for full publication of annual demand or dependence on China by mineral.
There are also points in this analysis that future documents could verify. First, if the government or the committee explains that the 113,400 tonnes for 2030 is single-year rather than cumulative demand and provides evidence, the assessment of the 45x figure would need to be revisited. Second, if the government publishes annual demand by mineral and clarifies how the 60% target is aggregated and what it covers, the inconsistencies remaining in current documents would be resolved. Since some mineral-level import data were already provided in the June 2026 parliamentary answer, the question now is how to link them to policy targets and to a risk assessment of the whole supply chain.
What Britain's critical minerals policy needs is not just a policy of reducing dependence on China. It is important to show, using consistent indicators, how many tonnes of which minerals are needed, how much the country depends on which countries, and how those shares change as a result of countermeasures. The government's response to the committee will be watched for whether it clarifies the definitions of annual demand estimates and supply dependence, so that progress on policy can be verified in numbers.