Security researcher Nightmare Eclipse has published "FastUnlock," a technique said to allow code execution on Windows 11 before sign-in. Security firm ThreatLocker also carried out an independent verification and reported that, when it had direct physical access to a device, it was able to run code before sign-in without administrator privileges.
While BitLocker, the Windows drive encryption feature, protects data at rest, access after a normal startup is controlled by Windows sign-in and file permissions. When a company suspects that a third party has touched a managed device, it needs to separately determine whether code was run on the device and whether stored data was accessed.
Execution privileges confirmed in the independent verification
The researcher who disclosed FastUnlock cited Windows 11 26H2 with the November 2026 update applied as the test environment. The attack requires physical access to the device, and the researcher says certain account configuration conditions also apply. Tom's Hardware identified the discoverer as Abdelhamid Naceri and reported that the technique requires physical access. When assessing their exposure, companies can start by comparing each device's Windows version, update history, and account configuration against the test environment.
In ThreatLocker's testing, code ran successfully while no user was signed in. However, the account used to run it did not have administrator privileges. If similar activity is suspected on a real device, it is important to confirm which account's privileges were used to run the process.
What BitLocker and Windows sign-in protect
BitLocker encrypts the entire volume to protect stored data. According to Microsoft's technical documentation, in a typical configuration, if a PC or drive is lost while powered off, the data on the volume remains protected by encryption. Once Windows has started normally and reached the sign-in screen, however, Windows authentication and file permissions control access. Even if some process could be run before sign-in, the range of files it could reach would therefore depend on the privileges of the account running it and on the permissions set on the files themselves.
ThreatLocker confirmed code execution before sign-in, but it has not been established which files could actually be accessed, or whether encryption keys or administrator privileges could be obtained. The full range of affected Windows versions and configurations is also unknown. For a device that a third party may actually have touched, it is therefore necessary to look not only at records of code execution but also at evidence of access to stored data.
Two facts companies should establish for managed devices
Companies need to establish two things: the time window in which a third party could have touched the device, and whether stored data was accessed during that time. First, check the device's usage history and entry and exit records for the location where it was kept, to narrow down the period in which a third party could have operated it. Then examine events on the device during that period to check whether any suspicious processes were run.
According to Microsoft's technical documentation on investigating devices, the device timeline in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint lets administrators review events observed on a device and related alerts in chronological order. Examining the period before and after the possible contact can help identify suspicious process execution and related events. However, how much can be investigated depends on the types of information collected from the device and on how long records are retained.
To judge the impact on stored data, it is necessary to review records showing that target files were actually accessed, taking Windows access controls into account. If suspicious program execution is confirmed, use that time as a starting point to examine the privileges of the account that ran it and the history of access to the target files. Matching the period of suspected contact against events that occurred on the device makes it possible to prioritize which devices need their records preserved and to narrow the scope of further investigation.
