On October 19, 2026, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) made public an order to exclude products and services from the Chinese AI company DeepSeek from federal civilian agency procurement and existing IT systems. The scope includes products and services that third parties developed using DeepSeek implementations. The signed order is dated July 24, and the published document is scheduled to appear in the Federal Register on October 20. Companies that supply AI to government agencies will now be asked what is inside the services they sell under their own names: which models they embed.
Third-party products are covered, for both procurement and removal
The DHS order dated July 24, 2026 includes third-party implementations of DeepSeek in both the exclusion from new procurement and the removal from existing systems. It was issued under the 2018 Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act, after DHS reviewed a recommendation and related evidence from the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC).
Read by category, the order pairs a measure against buying new products with a measure to remove what is already in use. The procurement exclusion also reaches agencies' lists of approved products and service providers' equipment lists. Agencies are also asked to remove DeepSeek from mechanisms that mediate IT purchases, such as electronic marketplaces.
| Category | New procurement | Existing IT systems |
|---|---|---|
| Products and services provided by DeepSeek and its affiliates | Excluded from procurement | Subject to removal |
| Third-party products and services developed using DeepSeek implementations | Third-party implementations included in exclusion | Subject to removal |
| National security systems and sensitive compartmented information systems | Outside the scope of this DHS order | Outside the scope of this DHS order |
The table cross-checks the "Applicability" and "Scope" sections of the signed order with required actions 1 and 2 on page 3 of the attachment and footnote 13. Footnote 13 includes third-party DeepSeek implementations in the procurement scope, so the name of the direct contracting company alone cannot determine whether something is covered. However, this table does not settle whether individual modified or derivative models or specific products fall within the scope.
The order directly targets federal executive agencies. This distinguishes it from U.S. private companies, and it does not impose a nationwide ban on DeepSeek use by individuals or businesses in the United States. National security and similar systems are excluded because separate authorities govern defense and intelligence functions. The "outside the scope" entry in the table should not be read as meaning that use is permitted for those purposes.
Data-leak concerns, and what the hands-on study confirmed
DHS cites the risks associated with servers located in China, that country's legal system, the collection of personal information, and the transfer of input data. DHS's assessment is that information collected by DeepSeek's directly operated service could be combined with public information to obtain information about U.S. individuals and government plans. It also mentions the possibility that the model itself contains malware or other vulnerabilities.
Still, there is a gap between listing concerns and demonstrating compromise across every model and delivery format. One technical basis the order cites is NowSecure's analysis of DeepSeek's iOS app, published on February 6, 2025. The company ran the app on actual iOS devices and examined its behavior.
The NowSecure report specifically showed behavior such as sending some registration and device information without encryption, and the use of outdated encryption methods and hard-coded encryption keys. Because this could allow parties able to monitor network traffic to read or alter the information, the company recommended that people stop using the app at that time.
What was examined was a mobile app. These results alone do not support the conclusion that all current DeepSeek models contain malware, or that a model run on an organization's own equipment would send the same information. At the time, NowSecure itself named using models hosted by other providers, or running models in-house, as alternatives. The study of the app's network implementation and DHS's assessment, which includes the origin of the model, address different things.
The July order, exceptions, and monitoring during removal
The signed order's "original issuance date" is July 24. Its submission to the Federal Register is recorded as 8:45 a.m. on October 19, with October 20 as the scheduled publication date. The timeline is not that a new order was issued in October and a grace period toward removal began that day. The required actions direct agencies to begin procurement exclusion and removal immediately after issuance.
Agencies may apply for exceptions. Applications can seek non-application to an entire agency or to specific actions, as well as postponement of implementation, but the deadline in the original text is "written submission within 60 days of the order's issuance." It is not within 60 days of the October publication date, nor 60 days before implementation. From the published order alone, it is unclear how individual applications are currently being handled.
An application must identify the product concerned and the scope of the exception sought. It must also show the impact of being unable to perform mission-critical functions and give compelling reasons relating to national security or similar matters, along with alternative measures that reduce risk. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) reviews applications and notifies the agency in writing of approval or denial. This is not a system in which a wish to continue use automatically results in an exemption.
Until removal is complete, agencies are advised to monitor inbound and outbound communications and strengthen logging. Controls to prevent information leakage and detection of anomalous activity are examples. These appear in the order as recommendations, which is a weaker standard than the requirements for procurement exclusion and removal. The DHS Secretary is to review the order within one year and annually thereafter.
Moving to another host does not decide procurement eligibility
Setting NowSecure's 2025 alternatives next to DHS's 2026 order shows that technical risk mitigation and procurement eligibility are separate conditions. Avoiding the official app and running the model in-house allows use without that app's own communication handling. The order, however, also covers third-party DeepSeek implementations, so changing only the country where data is stored does not mean it falls outside the order.
For companies designing services for government agencies, this means verifying both the contracting counterparty and the underlying model. Even if the service name shown on screen is not DeepSeek, using its implementation internally bears on procurement and deployment decisions. Selecting products to buy and re-examining products already in use will proceed as separate tasks.
The published order, however, does not provide a full list of specific products or the number of agencies that have completed removal. If it becomes clearer which modified and derivative models are covered, and which alternative measures qualify for exceptions, providers will find it easier to check their product configurations against procurement conditions. Whether government AI is adopted will depend not only on performance and where data is stored, but also on whether a provider can explain the source of the embedded model and the conditions under which its use is allowed.