Intel

Victor Costan, S. Devadas

Jo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin, Baris Kasikci, F. Piessens, M. Silberstein, T. Wenisch, Y. Yarom, Raoul Strackx

Joseph Izraelevitz, Jian Yang, Lu Zhang, Juno Kim, Xiao Liu, Amirsaman Memaripour, Yun Joon Soh, Zixuan Wang, Yi Xu, Subramanya R. Dulloor, Jishen Zhao, Steven Swanson

Scalable nonvolatile memory DIMMs will finally be commercially available with the release of the Intel Optane DC Persistent Memory Module (or just "Optane DC PMM"). This new nonvolatile DIMM supports byte-granularity accesses with access times on the order of DRAM, while also providing data storage that survives power outages. This work comprises the first in-depth, scholarly, performance review of Intel's Optane DC PMM, exploring its capabilities as a main memory device, and as persistent, byte-addressable memory exposed to user-space applications. This report details the technologies performance under a number of modes and scenarios, and across a wide variety of macro-scale benchmarks. Optane DC PMMs can be used as large memory devices with a DRAM cache to hide their lower bandwidth and higher latency. When used in this Memory (or cached) mode, Optane DC memory has little impact on applications with small memory footprints. Applications with larger memory footprints may experience some slow-down relative to DRAM, but are now able to keep much more data in memory. When used under a file system, Optane DC PMMs can result in significant performance gains, especially when the file system is optimized to use the load/store interface of the Optane DC PMM and the application uses many small, persistent writes. For instance, using the NOVA-relaxed NVMM file system, we can improve the performance of Kyoto Cabinet by almost 2x. Optane DC PMMs can also enable user-space persistence where the application explicitly controls its writes into persistent Optane DC media. In our experiments, modified applications that used user-space Optane DC persistence generally outperformed their file system counterparts. For instance, the persistent version of RocksDB performed almost 2x faster than the equivalent program utilizing an NVMM-aware file system.

Kit Murdock, David F. Oswald, Flavio D. Garcia, Jo Van Bulck, Daniel Gruss, F. Piessens

Dynamic frequency and voltage scaling features have been introduced to manage ever-growing heat and power consumption in modern processors. Design restrictions ensure frequency and voltage are adjusted as a pair, based on the current load, because for each frequency there is only a certain voltage range where the processor can operate correctly. For this purpose, many processors (including the widespread Intel Core series) expose privileged software interfaces to dynamically regulate processor frequency and operating voltage.In this paper, we demonstrate that these privileged interfaces can be reliably exploited to undermine the system’s security. We present the Plundervolt attack, in which a privileged software adversary abuses an undocumented Intel Core voltage scaling interface to corrupt the integrity of Intel SGX enclave computations. Plundervolt carefully controls the processor’s supply voltage during an enclave computation, inducing predictable faults within the processor package. Consequently, even Intel SGX’s memory encryption/authentication technology cannot protect against Plundervolt. In multiple case studies, we show how the induced faults in enclave computations can be leveraged in real-world attacks to recover keys from cryptographic algorithms (including the AES-NI instruction set extension) or to induce memory safety vulnerabilities into bug-free enclave code. We finally discuss why mitigating Plundervolt is not trivial, requiring trusted computing base recovery through microcode updates or hardware changes.